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European Liberalism and  
‘the Muslim Question’ 
Unlike in the United States with its sizeable Muslim population, it is wide-
ly held in many influential circles in the European Union that its over 
15 million Muslims pose a serious cultural and political threat, and that 
this shows, among other things, that multicultural societies do not work.1 
Sometimes this view is explicitly stated; more often it takes the form of an 
attack on multiculturalism for which Muslims are largely held responsible 
and which is a coded word for them. It cuts across political and ideological 
divides and is shared alike, albeit to different degrees and for different rea-
sons, by rightwing nationalists, conservatives, liberals and socialists. In this 
lecture I shall critically examine the basis of this view, paying particular 
attention to how the Muslim identity has evolved over the years, and why 
liberals, the champions of minority rights, cultural diversity and civic as 
opposed to ethnic nationalism, feel threatened by it.
Emerge nce  of  Musl im  Identi t y
Although Muslim immigrants had begun to arrive in Europe to feed its labour-
hungry industries from the 1950s onwards, they were culturally invisible until 
1 Articles and editorials in major national and local newspapers and magazines as well as 
parliamentary debates in European countries provide countless examples of this. This view 
is also reflected in serious works of political and social theory.
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the 1970s and politically invisible until the late 1980s.2 Most of them came 
alone, intending to stay for a few years and return home with enough savings 
to give them a better start in life. They had little command of the language of 
their country of settlement, were unused to the urban environment, and har-
boured a deep sense of inferiority, especially those coming from ex-colonies. 
They knew who they were, generally lived among their own people, did not 
see themselves as immigrants, and had little anxiety about maintaining their 
homeland-based identities. Since they faced racial discrimination, they united 
with other similarly placed groups to fight it, and acquired an additional, exter-
nally imposed, and in a few cases freely accepted, racial identity of ‘blacks’.
As Muslims abandoned their plans and even their hopes to return home, they 
were joined by their wives and began to raise families. They worried about 
how to bring up their children, ensure intergenerational continuity, transmit 
their culture, religion and language, and counter the assimilationist pressure 
of the wider society. This increased their interest in the culture, institutions 
and practices of the society to which they had hitherto remained indifferent, 
and they began to form a view of their place in it. By and large, they defined 
their identity in religio-national terms. They were Pakistani, Indian, Algerian or 
Moroccan Muslims, not Muslims simpliciter but rooted in the cultures of their 
homelands. The society in which they lived could not be so easily defined for, 
although Christian, religion did not play an important role in it. They saw it as 
basically secular, and the question for them was how to maintain their religio-
national identity in a secular environment.
Muslim immigrants set up welfare and cultural associations along religio-
national lines. They built mosques whose number increased dramatically in 
2 It is striking that Islam in Europe became an important area of research from the 1980s 
onwards. The European Science Foundation sponsored a collaborative Europe-wide project 
in the mid-1980s. Sweden convened a conference appropriately called ‘The New Islamic 
Presence in Europe’ in 1986. It is against this background that the Rushdie affair in 
Britain and the headscarf affair in France burst on the scene. Both involved young people, 
sometimes acting in opposition to their parents. Europe had now discovered and begun to 
fear its Muslims.
In the United States a distinctly Americanised version of Islam is beginning to emerge 
based on a clear separation between religious and secular matters, the individual’s right to 
interpret the Qur’an, giving the lay governing boards of mosques final authority over the 
imam, etc. Some commentators even call it Presbyterian or Baptist Islam. 
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the 1970s, and began to demand that state schools make appropriate provi-
sions for their children, including halal meat, facilities for prayer, exemption 
for girls from sports, swimming and other activities that required them to 
wear shorts, and teaching children their history and culture. They could not 
expect their children to acquire and value their identity unless they set them 
appropriate examples and provided a suitable domestic environment. Accord-
ingly, Muslim immigrants reorganised their personal lives and began to press 
for appropriate provisions in workplaces, hospitals, etc. for themselves and 
especially for their women.
Since European states have traditionally seen themselves as nation-states 
based on a homogeneous national culture, and since their earlier immigrants 
had made no such demands, the schools, workplaces and other public institu-
tions often resisted Muslim demands. This led to tensions, court cases, public 
debates and protests. As a result, Muslims now became an unmistakable cul-
tural presence and a source of public anxiety. Much agonised discussion took 
place throughout Europe on how to integrate them culturally. Different Euro-
pean countries worked out different models, France opting for assimilation, 
Britain for integration, the Netherlands for multiculturalism, and others for 
one or more of all three.3
3 In Britain multiculturalism has been welcomed by liberals and even conservatives since 
the 1970s. During the Thatcherite period, it was viewed with disfavour by conservatives, 
but liberals remained its strong champions, and even the conservative government did 
little to arrest its progress. Although the Rushdie affair dampened the liberal enthusiasm 
for it, they continued to support it. In recent years, especially after the events of 9/11, 
more and more of them are turning against it, arguing that it ghettoises communities, 
gives them a licence to continue dubious practices, and militates against common values 
and national cohesion. Most of the examples they give refer to Muslims. A similar trend is 
evident in Holland where multiculturalism was much valued for years and is now blamed 
for Muslim ‘separatism’. France, Germany, Belgium and Spain were never very keen on 
multiculturalism, and think that they were right in this reluctance.
Much confusion in the discussion of multiculturalism arises because the term is used 
in two opposite senses. For some it means treating each cultural community as a world 
unto itself and involves cultural relativism. For others including myself, it means that no 
culture is perfect and that it benefits from a critical dialogue with others, and involves 
rejection of cultural relativism. Once the definitional differences are cleared up, there is 
often no serious disagreement between those who reject and favour multiculturalism. 
Many who accept a multicultural society reject multiculturalism because they think it 
turns a regrettable but inescapable fact into a value.
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From the late 1970s and especially the early 1980s onwards, the situation took 
a political turn. Although their pursuit of cultural demands and the resist-
ance they encountered had already begun to politicise the first generation of 
Muslim immigrants and throw up political organisations, the second genera-
tion (which was now reaching adulthood) began to play a crucial role. Having 
grown up in European societies, young Muslims did not share their parents’ 
inhibitions and diffidence, and knew how to find their way around well in the 
political system. More importantly, they increasingly began to define them-
selves in exclusively religious terms, not as Pakistani or Algerian Muslims as 
their parents had done, but simply as Muslims. They did so for several reasons. 
Since they had limited contacts with their parental homeland, it meant little 
to them and was at best a minor element in their self-definition. In order to be 
politically effective, they needed to transcend ethnic and cultural divisions and 
build up nationwide organisations, which could only be based on their shared 
religion. Many of them, especially the girls, also chafed against parental con-
straints and found it strategically useful to counter them by studying and suit-
ably reinterpreting the Qur’an. The fact that many young Muslims were embar-
rassed by some aspects of their parental culture reinforced the desire to return 
to the ‘true principles’ of Islam. Since the wider society, too, had begun to refer 
to them as Muslims and associated negative ideas with the term, Muslim youth 
in the spirit of ‘black is beautiful’ asserted their Islamic identity with pride.
International events played an important part in reinforcing the conscious-
ness of Islamic identity. The basically non-violent Iranian revolution, in which 
almost all the violence came from the Shah and whose impact on Muslim 
consciousness was broadly comparable to that of the Russian Revolution of 
1917 on the European left, gave Muslims the confidence that they could topple 
Western-supported regimes and offer an alternative to Western modernity. 
The Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation brought together Muslims of dif-
ferent nationalities, forged a common identity among them, and convinced 
Muslims the world over that they could defeat a determined superpower. The 
dependence of the West on oil exposed its vulnerability and awakened Muslims 
to their enormous potential economic power. The continuing Arab-Israeli con-
flict, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the Muslim struggle against 
injustices and oppression in different parts of the world gave them common 
global causes and sharpened the awareness of the umma or the global Muslim 
community, a concept that had earlier played only a marginal role in Mus-
lim history. The historical memory of the centuries-long Ottoman empire and 
8
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9the way it was dismantled by European powers was increasingly revived, and 
used to intensify the Muslim sense of humiliation and the desire to restore its 
glory. By the mid-1980s, pride, power, the sense of victimhood, the tantalising 
dream of what over a billion of them, forming a majority in 55 countries and 
a significant presence in just as many more including the West, could achieve 
if they put their mind to it, and the deep anxiety that all this could be easily 
lost through internal divisions and western manipulations combined to form 
an increasingly global Islamic identity. European Muslims shared and asserted 
that identity and felt part of a worldwide community. The fact that they were 
courted and their religious institutions and activities generously funded by the 
oil-rich Muslim countries, especially Saudi Arabia, reinforced this trend.
The growing importance of religion in Muslim self-definition and others’ 
perception of them made European Muslims intensely sensitive to how their 
religion was represented in the West. Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, published in 
1989, was read against this background and was widely seen as an anti-Islamic 
work written by a lapsed, westernised Indian Muslim to impress and curry 
favour with a predominantly Western audience. The protests it generated both 
reflected and intensified Islamic identity. In France there had been a growing 
feeling that its Muslim population had remained only ‘paper French’, French in 
their passports and nothing else, and needed to be integrated. The Commission 
on Nationality appointed in 1987 produced its two-volume report titled Being 
French Today and Tomorrow a year later. The report insisted that Muslims should 
be ‘absorbed’ into the cultural mainstream, and their religious and cultural 
differences confined to the private realm. It was in this climate that l’affaire du 
foulard flared up. It acquired particular significance from the fact that 1989, the 
bicentenary of the French Revolution, witnessed aggressive statements of the 
country’s republican and secular identity. Muslim youth in Britain, almost all 
male, and Muslim girls in France led the battle for Islam, quite often against 
the wishes of their parents, and demanded that the state should recognize, 
respect and make public space for it. By the late 1980s Islam became a power-
ful political presence in Europe, its power deriving from its number, militancy, 
firm sense of identity, and global connections.
Bosnia was another important milestone in the development of Muslim self-
consciousness. It had two unique features. It was in Europe’s backyard and 
should have been of particular interest to it, and its Muslims were ‘racially’ no 
different from the rest of Europeans. In spite of the geographical proximity, 
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‘racial’ similarity and the considerations of enlightened self-interest, European 
governments not only did nothing to protect them but even prevented them 
from obtaining arms elsewhere. For many Muslims this showed Europe’s apa-
thy, even antipathy, to Muslims and how little it cared for their lives. Some 
even conjured up the lurid nightmare that if they lowered their guard, Europe-
ans could perpetrate another Holocaust against them. The twelve Danish car-
toons, published in Jyllandsposten in April 2005 and in which even the Prophet 
Mohammed was not spared, and the commentaries that accompanied them, 
led the Muslims to conclude that not only they as a community but their very 
religion was regarded as backward and unfit to be part of civilised Europe.
European  Anxiet y
As the politically visible Muslims began to define their identity in religious 
terms from the late 1970s onwards, Europeans began to wonder how to inte-
grate them and turn them into loyal citizens. A sizeable and influential sec-
tion took the pessimistic view that this was virtually impossible or at least 
exceedingly difficult. Such distinguished liberal leaders as Helmut Schmidt in 
Germany and Roy Jenkins in Britain even thought it a mistake to have admit-
ted them in large numbers. Islam, they argued, was inherently undemocratic, 
which was why no Muslim country had so far thrown up a stable democracy, 
and almost all of them strenuously resisted internal and external pressures to 
introduce one. European Muslims could not be counted upon to respect demo-
cratic institutions, and at best offered a prudential and instrumental loyalty 
to them. Since Muslims privileged the umma over the nation-state, they were 
far more interested in global Muslim causes than in their fellow citizens, and 
could not be trusted to be good citizens. Islam in their view was also profoundly 
illiberal and collectivist. It opposed freedom of expression, secularism, critical 
thought, personal autonomy and individual choice, and mocked such hard-
won minority freedoms as recognition of homosexuality, cohabitation, and gay 
and lesbian partnerships. Some liberals worried about an anti-secular alliance 
between Muslims and Christians, and the likely dominance of religion in pub-
lic life. Others thought that the fear of Islam would lead to the resurgence of 
conservative values. Cardinal Simonis of Utrecht confirmed these fears when 
he remarked : ‘Political leaders ask whether the Muslims will accept our values. 
I ask what values are these? Gay marriage? Euthanasia? We are disarmed in the 
face of the Islamic danger: we must recover our identity’.
AUP-ISIM-PA-09-BW-DEF2.indd   10 05-02-2008   10:38:38
11
Even those Europeans who were sympathetic to Muslims thought them too 
demanding. When the request for halal meat was met, they asked for a time-
off for prayer at workplaces. When the latter was met, they asked to ban blas-
phemous books. And when that was met or seen off, they wanted recogni-
tion of polygyny. And after that, they pressed for interest-free loans, Islamic 
banks and insurance companies, and so on and so on. In the ultimate analysis 
they wanted to live in Europe on their own terms. Their apparently innocent 
demand that the state should respect and accommodate their identity was part 
of the wider goal of replacing the ‘heathen’ and ‘decadent’ European with an 
Islamic civilisation. For these and other reasons, it was argued, they were an 
enemy within, an inassimilable cultural and political presence, which had to 
be contained and neutralized. This involved judicious use of force, aggressive 
assimilation, promoting liberal interpretations of Islam, and denying them the 
right to bring culture-reinforcing spouses from their homelands. Many lead-
ing politicians, including liberals, also thought that admitting Turkey into the 
European Community, as it then was, would gravely compound the problem 
and should be resisted at all cost.
The terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, London and elsewhere had a trau-
matic effect on Europeans. Hitherto they had seen Muslims as a culturally 
threatening but manageable presence; they now developed a morbid fear of 
them. Furthermore, this fear was transformed into the fear of Islam as a reli-
gion in whose name the attacks were believed to have been perpetrated. All 
Muslims qua Muslims are suspect, and those in Europe are assimilated to and 
seen as an undifferentiated part of the worldwide umma. They are expected 
and even asked to condemn terrorist attacks in any part of the world in the 
strongest terms, and those remaining silent or lukewarm are assumed to be 
in sympathy with them.
Thanks to the widespread distrust of Muslims and the belief that they do not 
wish to and cannot integrate, there is today an extensive moral panic.4 This has 
4 In the Netherlands, Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk announced that immigrants from 
now on would be compelled to pass an examination in Dutch language and culture and 
attend 350 hours of classes before becoming permanent residents. See Time, 28 February, 
2005, p. 37. In Belgium, Filip Dewinter, the leader of the Far Right Vlaams Belang Party, 
which won nearly a quarter of the national vote in the regional elections in June, 2004, 
wants to prevent Muslim immigrants from marrying in their home countries and bringing 
their spouses into Belgium. See Time, op. cit. p. 38. In Britain the Labour Government and 
many of its liberal supporters endorse this idea.
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led to a growing spirit of intolerance and nationalist backlash in almost every 
European country. The veil that had been around for sometime dominated 
public debate in Britain in 2006, and government ministers have refused to 
fund and have official dealings with the Muslim Council of Britain because 
of its allegedly inadequate condemnation of terrorism and weak control over 
Muslim youth. France has passed a law banning the hijab and even the Sikh 
turban. In the liberal and culturally relaxed Netherlands, a Muslim leader 
who refused to shake hands with a woman minister for cultural reasons and 
volunteered to greet her in other ways was widely attacked in the media. In 
Greece, Spain and Germany there is a strong opposition to building ‘too many’ 
mosques, especially in prominent places, because they lead to ‘Islamicisation’ 
of the country and alter its ‘visage’. There is a demand in many European 
countries that dual nationality should be disallowed, and that all immigrants 
should unequivocally opt for the citizenship of their country of settlement. 
As a way of, among other things, integrating and fostering patriotism among 
its Maghrebian population, the French National Assembly passed a law on 
23 February 2005 requiring all ‘high school history courses and textbooks’ to 
emphasise the ‘positive dimension of the French colonial era’. Although this 
extraordinary law was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, 
it is striking that the National Assembly passed it and that a large number of 
its conservative and even liberal members saw nothing wrong with it.5
5 For a variety of reasons, Muslims in the USA do not arouse this kind of cultural anxiety. 
Many of them are economically better off and are not residentially concentrated. Historical 
memories of Islam are also different. The geographical distance from Muslim countries 
is greater. The percentage of Muslims is smaller. Since the census does not gather 
information on religion, their number is estimated to be between three and six million, 
that is, less than two percent of the population. At most only ten percent of the new 
immigrants are Muslim. Since they are drawn from many different countries, they do not 
form organised communities. About a third of American Muslims are African-American 
converts, and hence Islam is not seen as a wholly foreign religion. The USA sees itself as 
a country of immigrants held together by the Constitution rather than as a nation-state 
based on a shared culture, and is less nervous about cultural and other differences. Its 
political structure both permits a greater range of ethnic diversity and prescribes clear 
limits to it, and channels immigrant demands in certain directions. The American society 
and culture are not tightly structured as they are in Europe, and leave greater space for 
and are less judgemental about diversity. Since it is much more religious than Europe and 
allows public expression of religion, Muslims feel more comfortable with it.
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In some European societies there are deliberate attempts to demonise and 
generate powerful feelings against Muslims. Take the following excerpt from 
an article by Daniel Pipes and Lars Hedegaard titled ‘Something Rotten in Den-
mark?’ that appeared in National Post, a Danish magazine, in the aftermath 
of the Danish cartoon affair. Although the article was widely criticised for its 
factual errors and alarmist tone, it had many supporters. The fact that it was 
published itself speaks volumes.6
“For years, Danes lauded multiculturalism and insisted they had no 
problem with the Muslim customs – until one day they found that they 
did. Some major issues: Living on the dole: Third-world immigrants – 
most of them Muslims – constitute 5 percent of the population but con-
sume upwards of 40 percent of the welfare spending. Engaging in crime: 
Muslims are only 4 percent of Denmark’s 5.4 million people but make 
up a majority of the country’s convicted rapists…Self-imposed isolation: 
Over time, as Muslim immigrants increase in numbers, they wish less 
to mix with the indigenous population. Importing unacceptable cus-
toms: Forced marriages … are one problem. Another is threats to kill 
Muslims who convert out of Islam … Fomenting anti-Semitism: Muslim 
violence threatens Denmark’s approximately 6,000 Jews, who increas-
ingly depend on police protection … Seeking Islamic law: Muslim leaders 
openly declare their goal of introducing Islamic law once Denmark’s 
 It is striking that Muslim immigrants arouse anxiety in a way that other religious 
and ethnic minorities do not. This has to do with their number, the kinds of demands 
they make, their forms and degrees of self-assertion, and of course the contemporary 
international situation. Historically speaking, the anxiety provoked by Muslims bears a 
resemblance to that associated in earlier times in some countries with Jews and Catholics.
Contrary to popular misconception, Islam has undergone more drastic changes than 
almost any other religion. Turkey under Ataturk underwent extensive secularisation 
including changes in dress, script, etc. that has no European parallel. Libya under Gaddafi 
broke the hold of the ulema, insisted on an officially sponsored radical interpretation 
of Islam, and even encouraged Muslims to date their calendar from the Prophet’s 
death rather than the hijra. Nasser proclaimed a socialist interpretation of Islam and 
nationalised Al – Azhar University in 1961. Almost all of these and other changes occurred 
during periods of crisis, were largely initiated by determined governments, and did not 
organically grow out of a sustained process of cultural criticism and change. This may 
partly explain why they remained precarious.
6 Cited in Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Ethnicities and Global Culture: Pants for an Octopus, Landham: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2007, p. 192
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Muslim population grows large enough – a not-that-remote prospect. If 
present trends persist, one sociologist estimates, every third inhabitant 
of Denmark in 40 years will be Muslim.”
The fear of Muslims has prompted deeply perplexed European leaders to ask 
what else to do to counter the ‘Islamic threat’. In addition to pursuing even 
more vigorously the strategy they had evolved in the 1990s, many European 
countries are devising new tools, such as greater surveillance of Muslims, 
a better network of informers, stronger anti-terrorist laws, detaining peo-
ple on suspicion, making ‘glorification’ of terrorism a criminal offence, 
monitoring mosques, banning imams from abroad, requiring them to show 
competence in local languages, greater supervision of their training and 
sermons, requiring Muslim leaders to accept greater responsibility for the 
behaviour of their fellow-religionists, denying dual nationality and impos-
ing stringent conditions of citizenship. Although many Europeans realize 
that such measures severely restrict the civil liberties of not only Muslims 
but all others and violate some of their deeply cherished values, they see no 
other way to deal with the ‘Muslim problem’.
A Crit iq ue
A careful examination of European societies shows that although the anxi-
ety informing the reaction outlined above has some basis, it is exagger-
ated. The terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, which between them took 
nearly four hundred lives, were all mounted by Muslims. They involved 
about two dozen young people, a third of whom were neither Spanish nor 
British citizens and not even immigrants. It is widely reported that several 
terrorist attacks have been foiled in France, Germany and Britain during 
the past three years. If true, and there is no reason to doubt it, they would 
most certainly have led to a considerable loss of life. In Britain there are 
estimated to be 200 terrorist networks involving just under 2000 identi-
fied individual terrorists under surveillance and hatching plots at different 
stages of development. The two recent failed terrorist attacks in London and 
Glasgow were mounted by about a dozen Muslims, though none of them 
was a British citizen. Between 500 and 3000 British Muslims are estimated 
to have passed through al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Several al-
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Qaeda cells were recently uncovered in Germany, France, Britain and Italy, 
and there is no saying how many more still exist, what their targets are, 
and how much damage they can inflict. The military group al-Muhajirun in 
Britain pumps out the most rabid jihadi propaganda against the Jews, Hin-
dus and the West in general, and says on its website that its aim is to act 
as a ‘fifth column’ preparing the way for a ‘worldwide Islamic revolution’. 
Although most of this is recent, the incitement to violence goes back much 
earlier. It was threatened against Rushdie in 1989. And on the eve of the 
first Gulf War, al-Muhajirun’s Omar Bakri, then leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir (the 
Party of Liberation), had called on Muslims to assassinate Prime Minister 
John Major, saying that he and many others ‘will celebrate his death’.
While a small group of disaffected young Muslims, acting alone or in league 
with militant groups abroad, have shown active disloyalty to their country 
of settlement and should be condemned, the overwhelming majority of 
European Muslims have a good record as a law-abiding community. Dur-
ing the past 40-odd years, there have been four Muslim riots in Britain 
compared with eight race-related riots by the Afro-Caribbeans. One of them 
concerned Rushdie’s Satanic Verses, others police insensitivity and racist 
marches through Muslim areas. All were relatively minor and lasted barely 
a couple of days. France witnessed three riots during this period, almost all 
triggered by local grievances or police high handedness. And even the week-
long riots in 2006 were caused by persistent discrimination, high unem-
ployment and police insensitivity. They were limited to the youth, did not 
challenge the authority of the state, and involved neither religious demands 
nor religious leaders. Britain has 300 Muslims in its armed forces, and the 
chief of staff Sir Nicholas Walker, who recently praised their loyalty and 
commitment, asked for more Muslim recruits.
Even when subjected to blatant discrimination, such as not being allowed 
for years to build mosques in parts of Italy and Greece or denied state fund-
ing for their schools on the same lines as Christian and Jewish schools in 
Britain, Muslims have either suffered quietly or protested peacefully but 
rarely taken the law into their own hands. They have also taken consid-
erable pride in their country of settlement. Both young and old Muslims 
appreciate the rights and freedoms they enjoy in Europe, many of which 
are not available in most Muslim countries, and value the support of their 
fellow-citizens in their struggle for equality and justice. In a British survey 
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in 2004, 67% of the Muslims said that they felt very or fairly patriotic, 11% 
that they were mildly patriotic, and only 15%, mostly under 40 years of age, 
claimed not to feel patriotic at all. In a BBC poll conducted just after the ter-
rorist attacks in London, 78% of Muslims and 73% of the rest of the country 
said that immigrants should pledge their primary loyalty to Britain, and 
91% of Muslims and 93% of the rest of the country said that immigrants 
should respect the authority of British institutions. The situation in the rest 
of Europe is broadly similar.7
As for the extraterritorial loyalty to the umma, it is neither unique to Mus-
lims nor often amounts too much in practice. The Jews press the cause of 
Israel, and their counterparts in other countries may support their coun-
tries of origin, as do Indians, Chinese, Pakistanis and others. What matters 
is whether the bulk of European Muslims are prepared to be disloyal to 
their country in order to promote the interests of the umma, and the answer 
to that is largely in the negative. Just over a couple of dozen British Mus-
lims fought with the Taliban, and they were roundly condemned by most 
of their community. Although we do not have the exact figures for France, 
Italy, the Netherlands and elsewhere, the proportion of Muslims joining 
the Taliban was even smaller there. When terrorist attacks took place in 
Spain and Britain, the bulk of the Muslim community roundly condemned 
them, showed their solidarity with the victims, and undertook to put their 
communal house in order. After the recent unsuccessful terrorist attacks in 
London and Glasgow, they organised peaceful marches and placed pagelong 
statements in national newspapers condemning them and declaring them 
incompatible with the principles of Islam. When two French journalists 
were taken hostage by the Islamic army in Iraq to pressurise the French 
7 See ICM Survey for the BBC, Radio 4, 24 December 2002. Rather surprisingly the 
proportion of those claiming to be patriotic was higher among men than women (71 
percent as opposed to 59 percent). Predictably it was higher among those at the top of the 
occupational hierarchy than those at the lower end (73 percent as opposed to 60 percent) 
and in the older generation than the younger (90 percent as opposed to 60 percent). 
Such polls can be highly misleading and should be read with care. Words like 
‘patriotic’ and even ‘primary’ loyalty mean different things to different people, including 
the pollster and his subjects. Many of us love our country but would not call ourselves 
patriotic because of the exclusivity, uncritical loyalty and intensity of passion associated 
with it. Our vocabulary in this respect is too poor and limited to allow the range of 
emotions one feels towards one’s country and its people, and these two are not the same.
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government to lift its recently imposed ban on the headscarf, the French 
Muslims mobilized as never before, and insisted that the Islamic army had 
no right to speak in their name and that their primary loyalty was to their 
compatriots.
Like millions of their fellow citizens, a large number of European Muslims, 
though by no means all of them, were bitterly opposed to the second war 
on Iraq, but remained content to join peaceful protests against it. Had they 
been so minded, they could have been far more noisy, tried to sabotage the 
war effort in countries belonging to the ‘coalition of the willing’, refused 
to pay their taxes, courted imprisonment, formed a human shield in Iraq, 
and used other familiar tactics. The fact that they did not do any of these 
things is significant. In Britain when the Imam of Finsbury Park mosque, 
who preached hatred of the West and urged support for the terrorists, was 
arrested and his mosque raided, there was some outrage but also quiet 
satisfaction that some action had at last been taken against him and his 
associates.8
Muslims have also shown respect for democratic institutions. They have 
participated in local and national elections, stood as candidates in fairly 
large numbers, joined mainstream political parties, and accepted the deci-
sions of the majority. When a Muslim parliament was set up in Britain in 
the 1990s by a pro-Iranian group to discuss issues of common interest and 
provide Muslims with a distinct political voice, it received little general sup-
port and became defunct, largely because of widespread Muslim hostility 
and factionalism. Calls for separate Muslim parties throughout Europe have 
gone unheeded, and Muslim candidates standing on Muslim platforms in 
local and national elections have almost always been defeated.
It is sometimes argued that the Muslim support for democratic institutions 
and loyalty to the state are largely a matter of political expediency and 
remain precarious. The argument makes a valid point, as reasons for sup-
8 Most of his audience consisted of young Muslim men whose parents took a different view 
of him. The Islam of the first generation immigrants is heavily folkish, oral, tied up with 
local culture and traditional. That of their children and grandchildren is textual, learned 
in mosques and schools, lacks historical continuity, is shaped by intellectuals rather than 
mullahs, and is often strident.
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porting democratic institutions do matter, but it does not apply to a large 
majority of European Muslims. As the extensive debate among them shows, 
they are exploring the moral dimension of their relationship to their coun-
try of settlement and beginning to articulate a theologico-moral theory of 
political obligation.
While a small minority dismisses democracy as a form of polytheism (shirk 
billah) that deifies people and sets up their sovereignty in rivalry to that 
of Allah, most Muslims take a different view. Democracy, they argue, does 
not deify people but subjects their will to clearly stated constitutional con-
straints including basic human rights. It shows respect for human dignity, 
protects fundamental human interests, ensures responsible use of power, 
guarantees freedom of religion and institutionalises shura, all of which are 
not only consistent with but often enjoined by the Qur’an. Although an 
enlightened monarchy might be able to achieve these objectives, it is heav-
ily dependent on the character of the monarch and inherently risky. The 
Prophet was one such individual, but it is naive to imagine that all societies 
can throw up men like him on a regular basis. For most European Muslims 
democracy is therefore a better form of government than any other, and 
they have a moral obligation to support it. This does not mean that they 
approve of its current liberal form. Many of them would like it to be more 
respectful of religion and less secular in its orientation, but most of them 
agree that its basic institutional structure is worthy of their support.
Political participation is being given a similar theologico-moral basis. While 
a small minority such as the Hizb al-Tahrir dismisses it as haram (or sinful) 
because it involves working with secular political parties and accepting the 
authority of secular political institutions, most Muslims take a very differ-
ent view. The fatwa by Taha Jabir al-Alwani, chairman of the North Ameri-
can Fiqh council, asks Muslims to participate in political life because it 
enables them to promote worthwhile causes, protects basic human rights, 
ensures responsible rule, and improves the quality of information about 
Islam and Muslim interests. For al-Alwani, political participation is not just 
a ‘right’ that can be surrendered, nor a ‘permission’ that may be ignored, 
but a ‘duty’ that must be discharged.
Loyalty to the state too is defended on Qur’anic grounds. The Qur’an places 
high value on the sanctity of contracts, and enjoins Muslims to show loy-
AUP-ISIM-PA-09-BW-DEF2.indd   18 05-02-2008   10:38:39
19
alty to the state in return for its physical protection and respect for basic 
freedoms. This argument was commonly made by British Muslims when 
a small number of them wanted to fight with the Taliban against British 
troops. It was further clarified in the Fatwa on British Muslims issued by 
Shaykh Abdullah al-Judai, a member of the European Council for Fatwa 
and Research. The fatwa insisted that one of the Muslim’s ‘highest obliga-
tions’ was to respect agreements and contracts, that they were contractu-
ally bound to their country of settlement, and that they ‘cannot take up 
arms’ against it even in order to defend Muslims elsewhere. This last point 
is disputed by some Muslims, largely members of an Islamist group lacking 
popular support.9
As far as the basic European values and practices are concerned, Muslims 
do not have much difficulty with many of them. Human dignity, equal 
human worth, equality of the races, civility, peaceful resolution of differ-
ences and reciprocity are all either enjoined by Islam or can be read into it. 
Although polygyny and female circumcision are practised by some groups 
of Muslims, they are disapproved of by others and are in decline. It is hardly 
surprising that the laws banning them provoked little Muslim protest in 
any European country. Two areas that have proved particularly contentious 
relate to the values of gender equality and freedom of expression.
Gender equality, though resisted by some, is being increasingly accepted 
by a majority of European Muslims. Women vote in elections and stand 
for public offices without facing much male opposition. Muslim girls go 
on to complete their school education and do better than boys. A fairly 
large number of them pursues higher education, though the proportion is 
smaller than for boys, often because of parental discouragement. However, 
that is changing for the better. Muslim girls are discouraged from pursu-
ing certain occupations, but that too is changing. They enjoy less social 
freedom and are sometimes forced into arranged marriages, but they are 
rebelling against this with some success. The struggle for gender equality 
9 The Muslim Manifesto published by Kalim Siddiqui’s London-based Muslim Institute in 
1990 took a different view. While agreeing that Muslims have a duty of loyalty to the state 
in which they have settled, it argued that the loyalty was overridden if in conflict with the 
umma. The Institute is openly committed to Ayatollah Khomeini, and reflects a minority 
view.
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is being fought in many families. And although the rebellious young girls 
and women are subjected to intimidation and violence, leading to nearly 
a dozen, sometimes horrifying cases of honour killing and many more of 
abduction every year in Britain alone, they are beginning to take collec-
tive action with the judicious help of the state. Young girls also invoke the 
authority of the Qur’an in their struggle, arguing that sexist practices are 
conventional in origin and lack a religious basis. This requires them to 
study the Qur’an well enough to interpret it. While prima facie such a diligent 
study of religion appears conservative, its intentions and outcome are often 
radical, as is evident in the growing popularity of ‘Islamic feminism’.
Issues relating to free speech have provoked the greatest Muslim anger, and 
an equally fierce reaction against them. Muslims do not question the value 
of free speech but rather its scope and limits. After all, they use it to criticise 
the West, highlight their grievances, press their demands, challenge some 
of their own ugly practices, and are its beneficiaries. Many of them value it 
not only on instrumental but also on moral grounds, and find a theological 
support for it. The Qur’an could not have been passed on and its message 
widely disseminated without free speech. The sticking point comes when 
free speech is in conflict with Muslim religious sensibilities.
Accommodating  Rel ig ion
One of the major causes of European anxiety about Muslim immigrants has to 
do with religion. Liberals in general and European liberals in particular have 
long been troubled by religion. For some it rejects many of the central princi-
ples of liberalism, such as humanism, individualism, critical rationality, com-
mitment to scientific inquiry, freedom of thought and belief in progress, and 
represents a reactionary and obscurantist form of thought. Others take a more 
discriminating view of it. They welcome it as a necessary corrective to human 
hubris and a valuable moral resource, provided that it is suitably rationalised 
and reformed and does not seek to dominate political life. Whether their secu-
larism is comprehensive or narrowly political, almost all liberals are convinced 
that political life should be organised along secular lines. The state, they argue, 
is equipped to deal with material and moral interests, not with the destiny of 
the human soul. Since it deals with matters that all citizens share in common, 
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its affairs should be conducted in a secular language which they all understand 
and share, and can critically assess in terms of public reasons. It is inherently 
coercive and must stay clear of the religious and other areas in which coercion 
has no place. It should treat all its citizens equally and respect their freedom of 
conscience, which it cannot do if it is tied to a particular religion.
In the liberal view, Muslims challenge this historical consensus and threaten 
to reopen long-settled controversies. They reject not only the comprehensive 
secularisation of society but also its more limited political form, and introduce 
religion into political life at several levels. They make demands based on reli-
gion, such as a particular form of animal slaughter, time-off for prayer during 
working hours, and exemption from certain laws and practices. They want 
the state to protect their religious beliefs and practices by restricting the free-
dom of expression and imposing unfair burdens on others. They reason about 
political matters in religious terms, debating whether the Qur’an allows loyalty 
to the state, support for democratic institutions, political participation, equal 
rights for women, or participation in a particular war. In these and other ways 
Muslims introduce a theological form of political reasoning in which others 
cannot participate but by whose outcome they are deeply affected. This rules 
out any form of shared public discourse, the sine qua non of common citizen-
ship. Liberals cannot see how a secular political system can cope with this sud-
den intrusion of religion, especially one that rejects any form of private-public 
distinction on which all modern states are based. Their anxiety is further com-
pounded by the fear that the Muslim example might encourage other religious 
groups and lead over time to the disintegration of the liberal political order.
Although liberals are right to worry about the danger posed by militant 
Islam, their anxiety in the European context is exaggerated and largely 
arises from a misunderstanding of how European societies are actually con-
stituted and conduct their affairs. No European society or political system 
is secular in the sense in which liberals use the term. Subject to the quali-
fications discussed in a later chapter, its Christian heritage has shaped and 
continues to shape its vocabulary, self-understanding, institutions, ideals 
and practices. The ideas of human dignity, equal human worth and unity of 
humankind derive their moral energy from it, and reappear in liberalism in 
their secularised form. The views of human nature and history that inform 
much of the European political thought and practice, many of its current 
laws and practices, and even such trivial things as treating Sundays, Christ-
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mas and the New Year as public holidays are all further examples of the 
continuing influence of Christianity. The fact that their historical roots are 
often forgotten and religion survives as culture does not mean that their 
religious basis or overtones go unnoticed by non-Christians. Muslims and 
for that matter devout Christians do not introduce an alien element in an 
otherwise secular society. Rather they speak loudly in the same language 
which the rest of society speaks in a quiet whisper.
The theological style of reasoning about political matters that worries liberals 
is not unique to Muslims. Anti-abortionists, pacifists, some groups of envi-
ronmentalists, champions of global justice, and opponents of Sunday trading 
reason from within the Christian, Judaic or some other religious tradition. And 
even some liberals only reproduce the basic Christian beliefs in a secular lan-
guage, as becomes clear when they are pressed to articulate and defend them. 
Contrary to what liberals imagine, our public life does not and cannot rest on a 
homogeneous view of public reason, for the latter is not a neutral and sanitised 
species of reason but is, like all other forms of reason, embedded in no doubt 
revisable particular traditions or philosophical frameworks. Our public life is 
inherently plural and includes several different forms of reasoning, such as the 
secular, the religious, a mixture of the two, and the countless varieties of each 
of them. Liberals wonder how citizens can communicate across different moral 
and political languages. In fact, they manage reasonably well.
Since many of these languages are precipitates of European history and form 
part of its common heritage, Europeans grow up acquiring considerable famili-
arity and even a measure of sympathy with some of them, and do not even 
notice their society’s mixed discourse. Unbeknown to them, they themselves 
sometimes speak in several moral languages. And when they do not speak a 
language, they often understand it well enough to respond to its speakers. 
From time to time there are no doubt passages of incomprehension and break-
downs in communication, and then they seek to improve their knowledge of 
other languages, find a common language, turn to translators and interpret-
ers, leave the matter unresolved, reach a tentative compromise, or do one of 
several other familiar things. What is troublesome about the Muslim political 
reasoning is not its religious character but its unfamiliarity. And the answer to 
that lies in greater interaction, sympathetic dialogue, multicultural education, 
and Muslim spokesmen acquiring reasonable competence in other languages, 
especially the secular.
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Secularism is a complex concept. Since religion matters to the large majority of 
Europeans and an attack on it can easily provoke public disorder, no European 
political system excludes it from political life. At the same time no European 
state allows it to colonise political life and threaten its citizens’ liberties. The 
history of every modern European state is a story of how best to balance these 
requirements. All European states are secular in the sense that they do not 
impose a religion on their citizens or make citizenship rights dependent on 
subscription to that religion, are not generally guided by religious considera-
tions in making laws and policies, and do not derive their legitimacy from reli-
gious sources. They do however allow religion its proper place in political life, 
including religiously based political parties and a religiously grounded political 
rhetoric. They also have institutional mechanisms for maintaining regular con-
tacts with major religious organisations, and many of them are provided with 
public funds to undertake secular activities.
Britain funds Anglican, Catholic and Jewish schools, and its government infor-
mally but regularly consults religious bodies in matters relating to them. In 
France religious schools, most of them Catholic, receive public subsidy, and in 
three out of its nineteen départements clerics are civil servants and appointed 
by the state. In Germany, the Jewish community, the Catholic dioceses, and the 
regional Protestant churches enjoy the status of publicly recognised corpora-
tions, a uniquely German legal category. The state collects taxes from mem-
bers of churches on their behalf and hands over the money to the churches 
after deducting the agreed administrative charge. Nearly 80 percent of publicly 
funded nursery schools are run by them on behalf of the state, and so are a 
number of hospitals and other welfare institutions. And while secular France 
refuses to take any notice of group differences, it recognises those based on 
religion and regularly consults the representatives of the officially recognised 
national organisations of Catholics, Protestants and Jews. Whether European 
states are right to do any of these things is an important question that does not 
concern us here. The fact is that they do so, and we should begin by accepting 
this as a fact of political life.
Within this framework Muslims pose no major problem. All that most of 
them ask for and what European states should do is to find ways of accommo-
dating them without radically altering the existing structure. This is broadly 
what is happening in practice, in some cases proactively, in others after con-
siderable resistance. France has set up a Council of Muslim Faith, a national 
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representative body, with the right to speak on behalf of French Muslims and 
enjoying a consultative status. In Holland Muslims are part of ‘pillarisation’ 
and have state-funded religious schools and television channels. In Belgium 
Islam has been a full member of the Council of Religions since 1974. Spain, 
which had been subject to Islam for centuries, tried for years to define its 
identity in opposition to it. In November 1992, it reached an accord with the 
Islamic Commission of Spain similar to that reached with other religious 
communities. The accord dealt with Muslim demands, such as the provision 
of halal meat, burial places, right to religious holidays, recognition of religious 
rights in hospitals, prisons and armed forces, tax relief, authority to perform 
civil marriages, and religious education in public schools. Although parts 
of the accord remain unimplemented for lack of political will and funds, it 
represents a public acceptance of Muslims as an equal religious community 
with the rest.
European societies have in these and other ways accommodated Muslims with-
out compromising their secular character. Muslims are given regular access 
to power, their religious interests are taken into account, their demands dis-
cussed and either conceded, shelved or rejected. At the same time the secular 
historical settlement remains firmly in place, and Muslims have not generally 
asked for nor will or should be allowed any changes in it. Indeed, since the 
existing arrangements treat them with respect and give them full and equal 
religious freedom, often far greater than what they enjoy in sectarian Muslim 
societies, these arrangements rightly claim and generally receive their moral 
support. They also make it easier for them to challenge the militant minority’s 
mindless fulminations against the ‘godless’ land of ‘infidels’. Liberal society 
has far greater intellectual and institutional resources and is far more flexible 
than its theorists imagine.
Defe n ding  L iberal  Societ y
Another factor that generates liberal anxiety about Muslims has to do with 
the defence of liberal values and practices. Liberals ask Muslims to give these 
their wholehearted moral allegiance. They do not want to say that ‘this is how 
we do things here’, because while that argument is valid in relation to local 
customs and traffic rules, it does not apply to moral values where it smacks of 
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moral coercion.10 Liberals want to convince them that these values are right, 
and think that this requires them to give transculturally compelling reasons. 
While such reasons are available in the case of some liberal values such as 
respect for human life, human dignity and equal human worth, they are not in 
the case of others such as individualism, personal autonomy, choice of spouses 
and minimum restraints on freedom of expression. There are good reasons for 
the latter, but they are internal to the liberal tradition and not transcultural. 
While liberals find them convincing, even self-evident, they do not convince 
many Muslims who sometimes find no supporting reasons for them within 
their own tradition. Other immigrant groups face similar difficulties, but many 
generally give in because they find supporting reasons within their tradition or 
out of self-doubt, timidity and prudential considerations. Many Muslims do not 
because they are as certain of their values and as determined to live by them as 
the liberals, and worry deeply about their erosion under the liberal impact.
The stage is now set for mutual hostility and suspicion. Each fears the other not 
just politically but morally and culturally, and sincerely believes that it cannot 
survive without defeating the other. The fear is particularly acute among liber-
als and leads to a veritable panic. Unlike the religious Muslims who feel sure 
that God is on their side, liberals have no such certainty and must protect their 
values and way of life themselves. Having long thought that history was on 
their side, they now find that it is acting capriciously and signalling the return 
of the ‘dark ages’ that they had successfully seen off several centuries ago. Like 
most such panics, the liberal panic is partly fuelled by a lingering self-doubt. 
Despite much agonised reflection in recent years, the more self-critical liberals 
realise that they cannot make a transculturally compelling case for some of 
their cherished values. Compelling others to live by the latter therefore gives 
them an uneasy conscience. Since Muslims precipitate it, they become a moral 
irritant, an object of fear and resentment. 
Liberals get into this difficulty because they claim more for their way of life than 
is warranted. The liberal way of life is historically contingent and embedded in 
a particular culture or form of social self-understanding. It is not underwritten 
10 Although Brian Barry, the leading British liberal political philosopher, talks a great deal 
about culture, he does not offer a systematic analysis of it. He often equates it with 
customs and thinks that it rests on the authority of tradition. He does not realize that 
culture could involve reasons that are internal to it.
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by history, mandated by human nature, or grounded in universal reason. Good 
internal reasons can be given in support of it, however, such as those based on 
the society’s history, experiences, moral traditions, cultural and religious herit-
age, circumstances and level of development. These reasons do not convince 
all human beings and command their allegiance, and there is no reason why 
they should. It is enough if they are good reasons, publicly debated, and carry 
conviction with all or most members of the liberal society. The liberal society 
represents one good way to organise human life, and that is a strong enough 
moral basis to stand up for it and to use such compulsion as is unavoidable 
and prudent. It is not the best, the most rational, or the only universally valid 
form of good society. If liberals make such a claim, as many Europeans liberals 
do, they not only cannot redeem it but end up accusing Muslims of being irra-
tional, morally obtuse, backward: not a way to win them over. Liberals should 
aim not to convince Muslims that this way of life is the best but rather to get 
them to see that it is one good way to live, not to assert that this is the only 
acceptable way to be human but rather that they and others understand their 
humanity in this way and have good reasons to commit themselves to it, and 
that Muslims should respect it. The aim should be limited in the sense of defend-
ing a particular society rather than prescribing a universal model, and modest 
in the sense of making a good case for it without claiming that no rational 
man can fail to be convinced by it. If some Muslims remain unpersuaded, they 
would at least see why others are persuaded and why they should go along with 
them for moral or prudential reasons.
Once culture is explicitly recognised and brought into the political discourse 
as a source of claims, an additional form of reasoning is available to both 
liberals and Muslims. The latter could legitimately argue that when they 
offer good reasons for their cultural beliefs and practices, these should be 
respected and suitably accommodated. For their part, liberals could argue 
that Muslims should respect the prevailing cultural beliefs and practices 
when good reasons are given for them. Such an appeal to mutual cultural 
respect has several advantages. It reassures Muslims that their culture is val-
ued by the wider society and that they need not panic and turn inwards or 
become intransigent. It reassures the wider society that it remains in charge 
of its cultural life, that Muslims will not seek to undermine it by irrespon-
sible demands, and that the differences between the two are to be resolved 
through a rational dialogue conducted in a spirit of mutual commitment to 
a common life.
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An appeal to mutual cultural respect also often avoids and sometimes even 
resolves otherwise intractable disagreements and controversies. Since the cul-
tural argument works both ways, it is perfectly valid for the two parties to say 
that one of them cannot be expected to respect the deeply held cultural beliefs 
and practices of the other unless the latter does the same. It is often forgotten 
in the heat generated by the l’affaire du foulard that over 95 percent of Muslim 
girls in French schools avoided the hijab largely out of respect for the French 
culture and its reasons for placing a high value on laicité, not because it went 
against French customs or some universal value.11
Difficult situations arise when both parties feel equally strongly about their 
cultural norms. A few French Muslim girls did insist on wearing the hijab, as 
did Fereshta Luden, a Muslim teacher in Germany, to considerable public out-
11 The French case is complicated by the fact that since Christian pupils are allowed to wear 
the crucifix, Muslims girls complained of discrimination. France could ban the crucifix 
or at least the cross as well, but dares not do so for fear of provoking public disorder and 
falling foul of human rights. It therefore argued that, unlike the crucifix, the hijab was 
ostentatious and had a proselytising dimension, and thus subverted the principle of laicité 
in a way that the crucifix did not. Although this argument is not as specious as its critics 
suggest, it cannot bear the weight the French government puts on it.
Wearing a hijab can symbolise many different things. It can be an act of subjection to 
parental or communal pressure and a sign of inequality. It can also signify the process of 
personal spiritual development or turning inwards, and be a statement of a self-chosen 
identity. As some French girls put it, it made them more restrained and inward-looking 
and less extrovert, and that is what they wanted. It can also be a way of conveying to 
boys without actually having to say it that they are not interested in certain kinds of 
activities or relationships. Since the hijab is open to conflicting interpretations, the school 
authorities and the government face a difficult decision. The French government took it 
to signify subordination, denial of gender equality and pressure on other girls to do the 
same. This enabled it to show that the ban did not contravene Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which protects the ‘freedom to manifest one’s religion and 
beliefs’. Switzerland and Turkey have taken a similar legal route.
In this connection a story, probably apocryphal, is relevant. There was a discussion 
at a tribal meeting in Kabul about ending the practice of women walking several steps 
behind their men. Young radicals insisted the women should not only walk alongside but 
ahead of men. This will show the world that the country has begun to change and bring 
more American dollars. To their surprise the greatest support came from the conservative 
elders. Their reasons were two. Since all roads were mined, men would not only be spared 
an early death but be free to marry again! The same view, but different meanings and 
contradictory reasons!
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rage.12 Such clashes could be between two important cultural norms, between 
a human right and a cultural norm, and sometimes even between two human 
rights. There are good arguments on both sides. The French laicité and the 
German principle of religious neutrality should be modified to allow the hijab 
and other defensible Muslim beliefs and practices. But equally, these traditions 
are valuable historical achievements, embody important values, exceptions to 
them alienate the majority, which is not in the Muslims’ interest, and set a 
precedent whose unexpected long-term consequences can be unfortunate. In 
such situations of what Rawls calls reasonable disagreement, it is wrong to 
claim that only one course of action is truly rational. Good reasons on both 
sides require and create a space for mutual accommodation and compromise. 
What form these should take depends on the context.
12 In Germany the teacher is a Beamte, a public servant representing the neutral and 
impartial state and expected to be above political, religious and other markers of 
identification. This is why he or she is required not to go on strike, to wear a neutral 
dress, and so on. When Fereshta Ludin decided to wear a headscarf in the school, she was 
told not to. She took the matter to the Federal Constitutional Court on the ground that 
she had a human right to practise her religion. Although the Court shared the general 
unease about her action, it had no alternative in law but to rule in her favour. There 
have been other such cases where exemptions from established practices were granted to 
accommodate the right to religion. 
Several of them complained that human rights were being used to change their 
culture and that Germans were losing control over it. While some of them did not wish to 
change any established custom, others wanted to draw a line at practices they regarded 
as central to their way of life. This involves striking a delicate balance between respecting 
human rights and upholding valuable cultural traditions. It is not obvious that human 
rights should automatically trump traditions. Courts may feel legally constrained to take 
that view, and then their decisions alienate a large majority and become contentious, as 
happened in Germany. Such matters are therefore best settled politically. Johanne Kandel, 
a keen advocate of Christian – Muslim dialogue, expressed this view well when he asked 
Muslim organisations if they were right to use human rights to ‘push through their 
interpretation of Islam by means of the German Courts’ and maintain practices that might 
be deeply offensive to the majority of Germans. See his article in Islam und Gesellschaft, 
no. 2, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, no date. Every liberal society contains a structural 
tension. It is committed both to human rights and to particular cultural traditions. When 
interpreted in a certain manner or pressed beyond a certain point, human rights might 
undermine the latter. Conversely, if the cultural traditions were to set the limits of human 
rights, they would emasculate them. Much good sense is required on the part of both the 
majority and the minority to maintain the balance.
AUP-ISIM-PA-09-BW-DEF2.indd   28 05-02-2008   10:38:39
29
I s l am an d M ult icultural  So ci e t y
Like their counterparts elsewhere, European Muslims have some difficulty in 
coming to terms with multicultural societies, and that aggravates the Euro-
pean anxiety. There is almost no religion whose followers do not think it the 
best one of all. This sense of superiority is particularly strong among Muslims. 
The Qur’an is believed to be unique in being the literal, unmediated, exhaustive 
and final revelation of the divine will. According to it, the Word of God was 
also revealed to Jews and Christians, whom are therefore respected and whose 
prophets are revered. Since their revelations, however, are believed to have suf-
fered corruption because of human mediation and the failure to live by them, 
Islam is supposed to ‘confirm’, ‘continue’ and ‘complete’ them. Although Islam 
is pluralist in relation to them while they are not in relation to it, its pluralism 
is articulated within an absolutist framework.13 As the Qur’anic verses say, ‘O 
mankind! The messenger has come to you in truth from Allah: believe in him, 
it is best for you’. And again, ‘Whoever seeks a religion other than Islam, it will 
never be accepted of him’. Although Jews and Christians, ‘the people whom 
God has guided’, are to be respected and left free to practise their religions, 
they remain legitimate targets for conversion to the ‘most perfect’ religion. As 
for other religions such as Hinduism, they are dismissed as polytheistic and 
idolatrous and unworthy of respect. The remarkable military successes of the 
early and medieval Islam generated among its followers a triumphalist spirit, 
and seemed to them to confirm their belief in its absolute superiority. During 
the centuries of European colonization, this belief was, and in their current 
sorry state remains, almost the sole basis of their collective pride, and has a 
powerful appeal for the overwhelming majority of them.
The belief in the absolute superiority of Islam is reflected in the constant invo-
cation of its past glory by moderate and militant Muslims alike. It is also evi-
dent in many of its beliefs and practices. While Muslims have a duty to convert 
the followers of other religions, they are not themselves free to convert to 
another, this being apostasy, an act of treason, meriting punishment in this 
world and the next. Most Muslims are anxious that others should learn about 
their religion, but few of them take much interest in others’. They may marry 
non-Muslim girls but do not allow others to marry theirs, and expect those 
marrying within Islam to convert to it. This cannot be attributed to the current 
13 Other verses such as 2:136, 5:48, 6:83-96, and 29:46 display a pluralist spirit.
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Muslim feeling of siege or fear of loss of identity. Even in the self-confident 
Ottoman Empire where Jews and Christians enjoyed considerable tolerance, 
they were treated as second-class citizens lacking the right to participate fully 
in its political life. While they were free to convert to Islam, they were strictly 
forbidden to convert Muslims or marry their women.
Thanks to all this, many European Muslims’ attitude to the multicultural soci-
ety is one-sided. They understand it in the light of the millet model of the 
Ottoman Empire in which different communities followed their own customs 
and led more or less self-contained lives. They welcome multicultural society 
because it gives them the freedom to live by and propagate their religious 
beliefs and practices. But many of them also feel uncomfortable with it because 
it puts them on a par with, and exposes them and their children to the influ-
ence of, other religions and secular cultures. As Shabbir Akhtar, an influential 
British Muslim thinker during the Rushdie affair, put it, ‘Our inherited (Islam-
ic) understanding of religious freedom and the nature and role of religion 
in society is in the last analysis being fundamentally challenged by the new 
religious pluralism in Britain’.14 In his view and that of many others, religious 
and cultural pluralism presents Islam as a religion of Muslims in a way that 
Judaism is of Jews and Hinduism of Hindus, and implicitly rejects its claim to 
universality and absolute superiority.
Such an approach to the multicultural society leads many Muslims to take an 
instrumental view of it, to welcome it because and only to the extent that it 
gives them the space to maintain their identity. It also encourages a narrow 
and static view of multiculturalism, not a transformative and open-minded 
dialogue between people belonging to cultures and religions but a compart-
mentalised social and cultural universe in which different groups live out their 
ghettoized existence. As a result, large groups of Muslims tend to withdraw 
or keep a comfortable distance from the wider society, and deny themselves 
the opportunity to interact with others, understand their views and concerns, 
and take a critical view of themselves. This partly explains their current ten-
dency to be unduly defensive about their religion and history, see slights when 
none might be intended, take minor criticisms out of perspective, fall prey or 
14 S. Akhtar, Be Careful with Muhammed! The Rushdie Affair, London: Bellow Publishing, 1989, p. 
32. See also his ‘Is Freedom Holy to Liberals?’ in Parekh 1990.
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react disproportionately to misguided rightwing provocations, and in general 
appear to want to live in Europe on their own terms.
European Muslims are no doubt changing, but they have a long way to go 
before they are able to participate enthusiastically in the creative tensions and 
controversies of the multicultural society, and make the contribution to which 
their great history and civilisation entitle them. For the first time in their his-
tory, they are living in large numbers in societies where they are neither rulers 
nor subjects – their historical situation so far – but fellow citizens enjoying 
equal rights with the rest in plural liberal democracies.15 This requires them 
to rethink the traditional views on their rights and obligations, their relation 
to other religions and cultures, and their response to modernity. Some of their 
thinkers like Mohammed Arkoun and Tariq Ramadan have begun to do just 
that, and their ideas are receiving sympathetic attention among Muslims not 
only in the West also in Muslim countries. If this trend continues and Muslim 
intellectuals in Europe successfully develop a creative Euro-Islam, they could 
play a vital role in setting off long overdue debates and offering valuable guid-
ance to the global umma.
Muslim  You th
I have argued that although the Muslim presence in Europe does not 
constitute a political and cultural threat and can enrich European life, if 
handled with wisdom on both sides, a small but deeply alienated group 
15 Europe is not dar al-Islam (an abode of Islam), but nor is it dar al-harb (the land of unbelief 
or war) because its large Muslim population is born here, enjoys all the rights and has 
begun to shape the ethos of the wider society. It requires Islamic scholars to develop a new 
category with its own appropriate claims and obligations. Zaki Badawi, a distinguished 
Egyptian-British theologian, invented the third category of dar al-sulh (the land of 
contract). It is helpful, but goes wrong in seeing Muslim citizenship as nothing more than 
contractual in nature.
Some Muslims mistakenly see their presence in Europe as comparable to the prophet’s 
hijra to Madina, and draw misleading conclusions from it. The prophet founded a new 
community with its own rules and structure of authority; Muslim immigrants are not like 
that. The prophet migrated to avoid persecution; Muslims are voluntary migrants. For a 
creative interpretation of Islam which takes account of this, see Tariq Ramadan, European 
Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford University Press, 2004.
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of young Muslims is a legitimate source of concern. In almost all Europe-
an societies, young Muslims underachieve educationally and are among 
the poorest members. Take Britain. Over half its Muslims live in areas 
with the most deprived housing conditions compared with 20 percent of 
the total population, and their unemployment rate is twice the national 
average. Nearly 70 percent of Muslim children live in poverty and receive 
state support, and some 36 percent of them leave school without quali-
fications. These socio-economic disadvantages are compounded by cul-
tural factors. Young Muslims are alienated from their parental culture, 
which they either do not understand or find conservative, backward, 
restrictive and not a source of pride. There is often limited emotional 
intimacy between parents and children, and very little meaningful con-
versation. Problems relating to drugs, mental health, personal relation-
ships and sexuality are considered taboo and are rarely discussed in 
families. Not surprisingly, many parents and elderly family members 
admit ignorance of what their younger members think, feel and do, as 
was confirmed in the case of some of those involved in the London ter-
rorist attacks in July 2005.
Although they have grown up in Britain, many young Muslims lack roots 
there and feel alienated from the country as well. This is due to sev-
eral interrelated factors. Residential concentration in some parts of the 
country means that they lead parallel lives, go to predominantly Muslim 
schools, and have limited contacts with their white counterparts. Unem-
ployment denies them the opportunity to participate in one of the most 
important areas of life, and to get to know and become an integral part 
of British society. Those who succeed in breaking through the barrier 
sometimes find that the wider society fears and takes a demeaning view 
of them, and that the national identity is too narrow and exclusive to 
find a respectable place for them.
Detached from their parental and British cultures, alienated young Mus-
lims tend to form their own groups based on a shared subculture of 
defiance and victimhood. Some turn to drug trafficking, prostitution, 
gang warfare and petty crimes. It is striking that young Muslims form 
nine percent of the prison population, which is three times their propor-
tion in the country. There is an increasing trend towards drug addiction 
among young Muslims, and a disturbingly large number of single moth-
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ers in London are Muslims. Many of those who avoid crime turn to Islam 
to give them a sense of dignity and identity, a particularly noticeable 
trend among college and university students. 
Although religious consciousness is quite strong among most Muslims, 
it takes a different form among the alienated youth. Their parents’ Islam 
is largely traditional, tied up with the culture of their homeland, and 
bound up with their ethnic and other identities. They revere the Qur’an, 
but their Islam is not narrowly centred on it and textual in character. 
They do not know Arabic and rely on the traditionalist ulema drawn 
from their native homelands to interpret it for them. The Islam of young 
Muslims could not be more different. Many of them read Arabic, have 
direct access to the text, and interpret it themselves or rely on others 
like themselves. Their Islam is ‘purged’ of local culture and is textual 
in its orientation. It is not woven into their lives as an aspect that is 
taken for granted as it is for their parents, but a self-consciously adopted 
badge of identity needing to be constantly asserted, an ideology provid-
ing them with a clear programme of action. Since it is a matter of con-
scious commitment, it is shadowed by a deep fear that the commitment 
might weaken or get diluted. They therefore become loud, rigid and 
uncompromising in their religiosity, both to guard themselves against 
the fear that they might slacken and to ask others to pull them up if they 
should do so. It is hardly surprising that compared with their parents, 
a much larger majority of those between 16 and 24 years of age favour 
Islamic state schools over the secular, want women to wear head scarves, 
prefer the sharia to British laws, and believe that a Muslim converting to 
another religion deserves to die.16
Freed from the ethnic, national and other ties and turning to religion 
as the sole basis of their identity, young Muslims are available for mobi-
lisation by militant groups with a global agenda. These groups idealise 
and flatter them by describing them as the ‘true elite’ charged with the 
responsibility to stand up for the honour of the umma. The pursuit of 
global causes gives them a sense of power, a purpose, a thrill, a sense of 
belonging, and a ready network of friends. The biased Western foreign 
16 Populous poll, cited in Policy Exchange Report, titled ‘Living Apart Together’, 30 January, 
2007. www.policyexchange.org.uk. 
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policies, the invasion of Iraq, and the scandals of Abu Ghraib and Guan-
tanamo Bay give their anger a moral edge and intensify their sense of 
victimhood.
There is also another important factor at work. Joining the ranks of Mus-
lim fighters in different parts of the world and engaging in terrorist acts 
at home and abroad involve risking one’s life, to which young Muslims 
(like others) are naturally averse. This is overcome by an increasingly 
popular interpretation of Islam among the young that thinks nothing of 
human life. Death in the cause of Allah is a mark of the elect, a calling, 
an expression of one’s love for Allah. It also opens the door to paradise, 
where one is reunited with the loved ones who have died, and eventually 
with those one has left behind. While the latter are on earth, they will be 
well looked after by Allah as a reward for one’s noble deed or by other 
members of one’s group. Death is seen as nothing but a wink, marking 
the end of a brief and painful sojourn on earth and the beginning of a 
happy eternal life. Giving up one’s life is thus made virtually cost-free 
and represents a perfectly rational choice, though of course the true 
believer sees it in much more grandiose terms.
An intriguing and highly complex combination of these and other fac-
tors throws some light on why some young Muslims are drawn to ter-
rorist activities. Unemployment and poverty do not by themselves lead 
to terrorism, but they generate widespread resentment, lack of purpose 
and apathy to the wider society, and create a climate in which there is 
pervasive indifference to or a weak and passive acquiescence in terrorist 
activities. Even when some family members of some of the British terror-
ists had a vague idea of what the latter were thinking of doing and did 
not like it, they either half-convinced themselves that they did not mean 
it, turned a blind eye or thought the matter too complex to worry about. 
The identity vacuum created by the alienation from both the parental 
and wider social cultures and filled by the obsessive religious identity is 
an important activating factor, and explains why the youth and not oth-
ers are drawn to terrorist activities. It links up the individuals involved 
with globalised Islam and brings them within the sphere of militant 
groups. The reading of Islam propagated by these groups makes death 
not only virtually cost-free but a special obligation on the intellectual 
elite, and has a particular appeal for the well-educated.
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The British situation is reproduced in different forms and degrees 
throughout the rest of Europe.17 Relative unemployment rates for young 
Muslims are broadly similar in France, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Spain, yet anti-discrimination legislation is relatively weaker. Few Mus-
lims occupy high public offices or represent their country abroad and 
symbolise their integration. As for educational underachievement, aver-
age income, child poverty, residential concentration, percentage of pris-
on population and inter-ethnic friendships, some European societies are 
marginally better on some indices and worse on others. All have a small 
but significant, rootless, deeply alienated and sulking Muslim underclass 
defining its identity in exclusively religious terms. This group sees itself 
as Muslims in Europe, Muslims who happen to live in Europe without 
any commitment to it, not as Muslims of Europe, that is, those who see 
it as their home, let alone as Europeanised Muslims or those who share 
its culture and values. Islam is the sole basis of their personal and public 
identity and is freed from the moderating influence of other identities. 
Since this is precisely what the Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
the Salafis and others advocate, they gravitate towards them.18
Reclaiming the Muslim youth requires addressing some of the factors dis-
cussed earlier, and is the joint responsibility of both the Muslim communi-
ties and the wider society. Senior politicians and public figures throughout 
Europe say that this involves ‘winning their hearts and minds’, but no one 
has a clear idea of how their hearts and minds (which are not the same) 
function and what winning them means and involves. It cannot mean that 
17 In France riots began in the high-rise, decaying and overcrowded housing estates of Sous-
Bois and Montfermail, where up to half the youth are unemployed and have nothing to 
do except watch television and peddle drugs. They are subject to frequent harassment 
and humiliation by the police. Almost a whole generation is being lost in this way. It is 
worth noting that American ghettoes present quite a different picture to their European 
counterparts. They have more poverty and violence, but they display a greater community 
spirit. Religion is generally joyful and uplifting, unlike many European ghettoes where 
it is aggressive and sour. Women play a greater role in holding families together in the 
American ghettoes.
18 See Olivier Roy, ‘Britain, home-grown terror’, Le Monde Diplomatique, 5, August 2005, p.1, 
where he talks of ‘born again’ Muslims and the ‘revolt of a generation adrift between its 
culture of origin and westernisation’. See also T. Modood, Multicultural Politics, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2005.
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the alienated youth should come to love their country of settlement as 
‘winning hearts’ implies, nor that they should uncritically endorse all of 
its policies or take a liberal or ‘moderate’ view of their religion as ‘winning 
minds’ implies. These things are not under the outsider’s control, and not 
even necessary. Rather we should aim at the more modest and realistic 
goal of ensuring that they become responsible citizens, discharging the 
basic obligations of citizenship including respect for the law and over time 
developing a sense of common belonging with the rest.
Although such widely canvassed proposals as asking the parents to report on 
the activities of their offspring, an extensive network of informers, requir-
ing universities to report on Muslim students, spying on what the imams 
say in their Friday sermons, and restricting the foreign visits of young Mus-
lims cannot be ruled out under all circumstances, they are fraught with 
grave danger and often counterproductive. They not only alienate Muslim 
communities but destroy the very trust and cohesion they need to carry any 
kind of moral authority with their youth. Teaching citizenship in madrasas 
is of marginal value, because that is not where much of the jihadi ideology 
is picked up. And even if it sometimes is, formal classes on moral values can 
have only a limited impact. Requiring the imams to be trained in European 
societies has only a limited value because the jihadi ideology is picked up 
not only from them but from a variety of other sources, and there is no 
reason why the locally trained imams should be ‘moderate’. In the days of 
globalisation, ideas and passions flow through countless channels, and the 
solution cannot be entirely local.
Individuals develop a commitment to their society and form a view of their 
place in it on the basis of their experiences of how it views and treats them, 
and that should be our focus. European societies need to give young Mus-
lims a stake in society, hope for a better future, and the opportunity to 
develop and enjoy multiple and mutually moderating identities. They should 
develop well-planned educational, economic and other strategies to tackle 
the roots of their disadvantages and alienation, and do so in consultation 
with them. They should also treat them with respect, and so define their 
identity that all Muslims (including the young) feel an integral and valued 
part of it. While guarding against murderous attacks by all necessary and 
legitimate means, they should stay within the law, respect human rights 
and avoid appearing to target Muslims. No government measures can work 
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without the cooperation and support of the Muslim communities, and it 
must do nothing to forfeit that. Foreign policy necessarily has domestic 
implications and cannot be framed in isolation. This is particularly so in our 
interdependent world where groups of citizens are part of a global network. 
While European societies cannot be held hostage to sectional pressures, 
though they sometimes are, both justice and the need for a national consen-
sus require that their policies in relation to the Middle East and elsewhere 
should be far more even-handed than they have been so far.
Muslim communities have an equally important role. They need to take a 
long and overdue critical look at themselves, and find ways of overcoming 
the pervasive sense of victimhood and the tendency to father all their ills 
on the wider society. They need to repair their disintegrating social fabric, 
build strong families and support networks, take greater interest in and 
responsibility for their youth, and reform those social and religious prac-
tices that stifle and alienate them. When the Afro-Caribbean youth in Brit-
ain became notorious for their subculture of drugs, violence and contempt 
for educational achievement, their community leaders used all available 
forums including the black churches and communal gatherings to cam-
paign against it. Although their problems still persist, they are less acute, 
and Muslim communities could usefully follow their example. Their intel-
lectuals and religious leaders also need to take the battle to their youth, and 
challenge their perverted reading of Islam by offering a better alternative.
The closer co-operation between the government and the Muslim commu-
nities raises difficult questions about the nature, role and legitimate sphere 
of action of the government, and challenges some of the current liberal 
ideas on the subject. We generally assume that the government should not 
interfere with what goes on in religious gatherings and what the preachers 
preach there, that it has no business taking an active interest in how par-
ents bring up their children and relate to them, that it is none of its concern 
where people go for their holidays, that it should stay clear of how people 
interpret their religious texts and the kind of debate they throw up, and 
so on. These and many other related restraints are being breached, and we 
need to ask if we are right to do so and why. Our legal and political thinkers 
have their task cut out for them, and it will be interesting to see how they 
meet the challenge.
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